



FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

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Can NATO Unity Be Restored?

by William R. Frye

UNITED NATIONS—The explanation of much that has happened at Geneva this summer, United Nations diplomats say, can be summed up in one simple proposition: If U.S.S.R. Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev can split NATO or otherwise render it ineffective, he will not have to pay a price to secure what he wants—namely, relief from Western pressures on the Soviet satellite empire. He will have that relief for nothing.

Unhappily for the West, there is a very real possibility that unless current rifts in NATO are healed Khrushchev will in fact get his objective on a silver platter. A weakened and divided NATO would not exert any effective pressure.

The principal split in NATO is the one that divides France from the United States and Britain. This split springs in very large part from a second East-West meeting which has been taking place at the Palais des Nations in Geneva—the conference on a nuclear test ban. This conference threatens to split the West because if an agreement should be reached, there would be great world pressure on France to abandon its effort to become a nuclear power.

France would not be legally bound by a test-ban treaty. But it would be extraordinarily difficult for the French to defy the wave of public sentiment which would well up if the United States, the U.S.S.R. and Britain should agree to end their tests. From Tokyo to Delhi, from Stockholm to Accra, people would be tossing their hats in the air in the belief that the danger of radiation poisoning had been ended and the spread of nuclear weapons around the world had been prevented.

If France should then inject a new dose of strontium 90 into the atmosphere, it would bring down on itself world-wide condemnation comparable to that of Moscow at the time of the bloody suppression of the Hungarian revolt. No nation—let alone France with its sensitivity and pride—wants to take such punishment.

In the past, test-ban negotiations have done little to divide France from its NATO allies because, to put it bluntly, no one in Paris ever thought there would be an East-West nuclear agreement. But now that an agreement has become possible, indeed likely, the pressures on NATO have grown heavier and heavier.

Many of the other developments which now

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embitter France's relations with its allies are directly or indirectly related to the test-ban issue.

If France is to be denied admission to the "nuclear club," at least by the front door, it will be frozen in the category of a second-rate world power. This possibility explains General Charles de Gaulle's strenuous efforts to re-establish France's position before a test ban goes into effect.

If France is never to have its own nuclear weapons, or is never to have a fully-tested stockpile of sufficient numbers and varieties, it is all the more eager to share in the control of any American nuclear weapons placed on its soil.

Nuclear Test-Ban Strain

Even Algeria—a seemingly unrelated issue—has a nuclear angle. One of the unspoken reasons why the United States Congress has hesitated to help France manufacture the atomic bomb is a fear—which the French consider very far-fetched—that, in an extremity, the bomb might be used against the Algerian rebels, destroying for generations any hope of friendship between the Christian of the Atlantic community and the Muslim of North Africa.

If Congress were willing to give France American atomic "secrets"—which certainly are not secrets from Russia—France could immediately accept a nuclear test ban. It would not need a test program of its own. But Congress is not willing to do so, and the Geneva test-ban negotiations therefore continue to put great

strain on the structure of NATO.

Moscow, for its part, is doing everything to maximize the strain. This is a major reason, and probably the principal reason, why the U.S.S.R. has been conciliatory in the test-ban negotiations, willing to yield to some extent in the face of Western demands. The nearer a test-ban agreement comes, the deeper are the splits in NATO.

While awaiting the results of this divisive maneuver, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko has been sitting "on a block of ice," to use Khrushchev's phrase, at the other, more highly publicized, Geneva conference—the one on Berlin. There is no need, from his point of view, to pay a stiff price—say, German reunification—for an easing of tension when this can be obtained for little or nothing by agreeing to a test ban.

Disengagement Difficult

If the rifts in NATO persist and grow, it will become virtually impossible for the West to negotiate a cold-war settlement with Russia, not simply because the West will have lost its bargaining power, but because of another practical consideration. There is scarcely any conceivable East-West settlement which would not involve disengagement in one form or another. But if East and West were to disengage in Central Europe, American forces would have to fall back primarily on France; and if France should not welcome the presence of American forces, disengagement would be out of the

question. This has already been foreshadowed by the necessity of moving United States nuclear bombers off French soil.

The situation, however, need not be allowed to disintegrate any further. Some of de Gaulle's desire for renewal of France's "grandeur" can perhaps be satisfied by impressive honors and hospitality, such as Italy, for example, accorded the General in June. Washington can consult more closely with the French government, which in Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville has a very valuable idea-man. The Pentagon is having a new look at the necessity for 100 percent American control over atomic stockpiles abroad, and perhaps some of France's wishes in this respect can be met. The United States could give France diplomatic support on Algeria in the UN if France would display more flexibility on negotiations with the rebels. Western diplomats here regard some such program of counteraction as the obvious answer to Khrushchev's Geneva tactics. The stable France which has emerged in the past year should be, and could be, a major asset to NATO instead of being a source of weakness, as it is today.

But until something effective is done to make NATO's strength and unity facts rather than slogans, Gromyko will continue to sit on his block of ice—and the West, rather than the U.S.S.R., will have cause to shiver.

Mr. Frye, a member of the staff of *The Christian Science Monitor* since 1941, has been its United Nations correspondent for eight years.

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Was Kozlov's Visit Useful?

Soviet First Deputy Premier Frol R. Kozlov came to the United States for a purpose—or rather several purposes. He came ostensibly to open the Russian exhibition at the New York Coliseum. He also came to find out for himself (and report to his boss, Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev) whether President Eisenhower really meant what he said about not giving “an inch” in the dispute over Western rights in Berlin. He came, too, to test the American climate and spread the word that Khrushchev would like to visit the United States. And he came to drum up trade between the United States and the U.S.S.R.

The opening of the New York exhibition was impressive, and crowds continue to testify to the interest it has aroused. President Eisenhower visited the show, if only to make sure that Khrushchev would do the same for Vice President Richard M. Nixon when Nixon formally opened the American National Exhibition in Moscow on July 25.

Kozlov — and Khrushchev

What Kozlov reported to his superior about American determination to defend Berlin is anyone's guess. But if he reported anything except a fixed determination on the President's part he will have done his chief—and the world—a real disservice. This point was repeatedly made to Mr. Kozlov by the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State and members of the Senate. Americans can only hope he fully understood it, and reported it home.

Mr. Kozlov did not make an open request to have his boss, Premier

Khrushchev, come to the United States. At San Francisco, however, he told the natives that their city is favored by Khrushchev as the site for a summit conference. What Kozlov did find out was that he himself caused much less of a stir in the United States than he—or we—had expected. As a matter of fact, his colleague, the other first deputy premier of the U.S.S.R., Anastas I. Mikoyan, who visited the United States last January, proved a much greater attraction.

Two things could account for this difference: Mikoyan, as the first top Soviet official to visit the United States since the cold war broke out, was something of a curiosity—although, it is true, he visited here unofficially; and secondly, Mikoyan is more of a “character” than Kozlov. Mikoyan is bold, confident, unpredictable; Kozlov is friendly, genial—but cautious.

It was during the Kozlov visit that former Governor W. Averell Harriman's “tough” interview of June 23 with Khrushchev was relayed to Washington. Views differed here as to whether Khrushchev's statement was as dangerous as it sounded—or was only his final bid to be tough before the foreign ministers met again at Geneva for another try at a German settlement. At any rate it spoiled the “sweetness and light” efforts of Mr. Kozlov, causing Mr. Nixon to assert in Los Angeles on July 4 that “Khrushchev is pulling the rug out from under the peace campaign that Kozlov is waging.”

Mr. Kozlov's theme across the country—like all Soviet propaganda—emphasized the friendliness, peaceful intentions and good will of the

U.S.S.R. He reiterated that the Soviet government expresses the will of the Soviet people; that the Kremlin has no interest in foisting communism on any country; that the Russians are building a new society based on justice and social order. Americans, however, showed little interest in the Kremlin's No. 2 man. The Washington press corps, which generally smothers visiting notables with attention, had to be practically commandeered to provide an audience for Mr. Kozlov at a press-TV luncheon. He then made matters worse by insisting on the right to screen any written questions presented—which he proceeded to do with dismaying frequency.

As for Kozlov's trade efforts, they met about the same fate as those of his colleague Mikoyan. The United States made it clear to both that it is not planning to lend Moscow the money to buy the American items the Kremlin wants; and American businessmen are forbidden by law to extend credit as long as the Soviet government has not settled its World War II lend-lease account. The fact is that most of what the Russians want they can get only from the United States; but what they are ready to sell in return the United States can get from various other places.

Kozlov's visit, however, was not in vain. If he told Khrushchev the facts about American policy on Berlin, that alone would justify the trip. And if he learned anything about Western democracy, this might be good for the world—for according to Mr. Harriman, he may be the next premier of the U.S.S.R.

NEAL STANFORD



U.S. and U.S.S.R.: Pitfalls of Comparisons

Two exhibitions this summer—that of the U.S.S.R. at the Coliseum in New York and that of the United States in Moscow's Sokolniki Park—have brought to a climax a game, popular in both countries, of comparing each with the other. A score is kept by both, as if they were major league baseball teams—but in this case the score is wide-ranging. It is kept in terms of missiles, sputniks, pianists and violinists, art (conventional or avant-garde), feminine apparel, animals rocketed into space, number of television sets and washing machines per capita—in fact anything you want to name.

This kind of comparison can be very instructive and it serves as a stimulus for each country to outdo the other in those respects where it thinks it may be deficient or as yet underdeveloped. But it is also fraught with pitfalls, and even dangers. For it represents an attempt to make comparisons between factors which are not, in reality, comparable.

"Catch Up With and Outstrip"

It is the Russians who set off this comparison race. The United States would hardly have thought in the 1930's that there could be much to compare between the most technologically advanced industrial democracy of modern times and Russia, historically a great power, but then a totalitarian state at least a hundred years or so behind the United States in economic development. Stalin, however, proclaimed as his objective to have Russia "catch up with and outstrip the United States."

Although we may not have realized it at the time, the starting shot had been fired, the race was on—and

now, some 30 years later, after a devastating world war which took a toll of men and resources on both sides (but incomparably more from Russia than from the United States), some of the results are being posted on the international scoreboard.

No country in the world is more predisposed by national temper to competition than the United States. Competition—the striving constantly to outperform, outbid, outsell one's challengers—has been the powerfully vitalizing element of American capitalism, which in this respect differs profoundly from the more static capitalism of Europe. The prospect of competing with the U.S.S.R. on the international stage—of pitting the over-all results achieved by a capitalist society against those of a Communist society — could and should stir our imagination and rouse our energies. But if we are to compete intelligently and avoid possible disappointment and even defeatism, we must see this contest in realistic terms.

Contestants Unequal

The contest, at the start, is not between carefully matched equals or near equals, such as one might have between tennis players at Wimbledon or between boxers in the ring. One of the contenders is a highly industrialized country, inheritor of the traditions and institutions of Western democracy matured over centuries and transformed here into a new form of democracy by immigrants from many lands who built a multiracial society on a continent which was once a wilderness—and which, until the nuclear age, enjoyed a security from outside attack un-

matched in the history of the world.

The other contender is a country which at the turn of the 19th century was still in the early stages of the Industrial Revolution; which had been little affected by the ideas and practices that shaped the Western world; which had not been exposed to the humanism of ancient Greece, the law and administration of ancient Rome, to Roman Catholicism, to the civilization developed by Europe's Middle Ages, the Reformation, the Renaissance; which had heard only faint echoes of the English, French and American revolutions; and whose landlocked geographic position deprived it of ice-free exits to open seas, and exposed it to overland invasions across both its European and Asian borders.

In a contest between such fundamentally different rivals, the goals must necessarily be profoundly different, and thus the opinions of the judges must be carefully weighted. The U.S.S.R. is like a horse which, before the race, had been given no chance of winning. Any success it scores as the race gathers speed will assume far greater significance in the eyes of spectators than the accomplishments, however significant, of the steed which from the outset had been regarded as the winner. Or to put this in another way: no one is surprised if the already rich and habitually successful man becomes richer and more successful. But there is surprise, and even a hidden satisfaction, on the part of those who are themselves poor and unsuccessful when one who was once in their ranks suddenly sweeps ahead and makes good.

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Population and Food: Precarious Balance

by Murray R. Benedict

Dr. Benedict has been professor of agricultural economics and agricultural economist on the Giannini Foundation at the University of California in Berkeley since 1931. Author of many books, he is just completing a study of farm surpluses and foreign markets.

With a rapidly growing world population and mounting agricultural surpluses in the United States, we are faced with a puzzling paradox of too much and too little. The fact that views on this subject differ so widely makes it especially difficult for the public in general to get a clear picture of the issues involved.

The central elements of the problem are these:

1. World population is growing at a phenomenal rate—clearly, it would seem, at too fast a rate. Our inability to slow it down is one of the most frustrating aspects of the situation. The problem tends to grow so rapidly that even better designed programs than those we now have might not enable us to keep abreast of population growth, much less to gain on it.

2. The focus of the population-food problem has changed markedly since the late 1940's. Then it was particularly acute in the war-torn areas of Western Europe, and created an emergency short-term task. Our approach to Europe's difficulties was statesmanlike, constructive and relatively effective. Now the major food supply problems are in the vast areas characterized by poverty, crowding and chronic low standards of living.

3. The paradox we face is that in a few countries, notably the United States, technological progress in agriculture proceeds at such a pace that we have great difficulty in adjusting consumption fast enough to keep it in reasonably good balance with production.

On the one hand, we are faced by scarehead titles such as the *Road to Survival* and *Our Plundered Planet*. On the other hand, some of our scientists and agricultural economists tell us that the current rate of technological advance will not only continue but will be accelerated in such a way that farm surpluses may increase instead of declining. They are talking, in the main, about the United States, and to a lesser extent about Canada, Australia and New Zealand. But some writers pick up these statements and apply them to other parts of the world, where they surely do not fit. In fact, even for the United States, these statements are speculative, controversial and very possibly exaggerated.

Agricultural Revolution

This is not to say that we ourselves are in immediate danger of food shortages. The upsurge in agricultural production efficiency in the United States since 1940 is phenomenal and, so far as the record shows, unparalleled in world history. We are in the midst of a technological revolution in United States agriculture which is somewhat comparable to the Industrial Revolution that affected Western Europe and the United States so profoundly in the period around 1800.

This new revolution has been chiefly in yields per acre and in manpower requirements. Even with our greatly increased population and huge agricultural surpluses, we are not using as much cropland as we did in the 1920's and 1930's, and our

farm labor force is at least a third smaller than it was then. This is where part of our problem lies. We cannot withdraw resources from agriculture fast enough to avoid sagging prices and the accumulation of surpluses. Many well-meaning people propose that we transfer our techniques to countries which are short of food, and in that way solve the problem. Efforts are, of course, being made to do this, but they are far less effective than we would like them to be.

What makes the situation in the United States, Canada and Australia so different from that in the areas where food supplies are inadequate and precarious? One important factor is land, another is capital, still others are the level of education and the people's attitude toward innovations. The existence of opportunities for nonfarm employment and the nature of the landownership pattern also affect the situation in every country.

In the world as a whole, more than two-thirds of the people are engaged in agriculture. Here in the United States, farm workers—who form no more than 11 or 12 percent of the country's total work force—give us an embarrassingly large agricultural output. But ours is a country in which the size of farms is flexible and the units are large. This has made possible the quick adoption of power machinery and of many other technological improvements which are poorly suited to small-scale agriculture. Perhaps even more important is the fact that, except in the

1930's, we have had a rapidly growing industrial economy which could easily absorb labor released from agriculture. This possibility of alternative employment does not exist in most of the overcrowded underdeveloped countries.

A quick and large-scale transfer of American technology to the overcrowded countries is not in the cards. We must continue to push in that direction and we must speed modernization of other lands as much as we can, but all this will still not be fast enough or comprehensive enough to do the job that needs to be done. Along with modernization, there must be a broader and more significant attack on the basic problem of overpopulation.

What About Surpluses?

Let us turn now to another aspect of the problem—one which in some ways touches us more closely, although it is not more important. We have accumulated very heavy stocks of some farm products, and are concerned both to keep them from becoming more burdensome and to make the best use of them. Many believe that these surpluses, which seem liabilities rather than assets, might well be used to ease conditions in other countries. This view has merit, but there are some serious obstacles to be overcome in trying to solve the problem by such a method.

One of the difficulties is that much of our excess food is not what the underfed nations most need and want. Their great need is not for increased cereal consumption but rather for animal proteins and other high-quality foods. To supply large quantities of such foods, we would have to change our production pattern considerably and at heavy additional expense.

Secondly, there is reason to question whether large-scale transfer of foods, except in emergencies, would

in the long run benefit the recipient countries themselves. The vital need in most of these countries is an expansion of domestic production. A temporary heavy inflow of imports, no matter how cheaply obtained, may hamper progress in that direction, unless it is very carefully planned so as to fit into a longer-term program of development. Somewhat related to this is the fact that nearly all of these countries are predominantly agricultural. Poverty-ridden farmers tend to be antagonistic to heavy imports of competing farm products, no matter how serious the national need for them may be. This means that even the most generous and well-intentioned surplus foods program, so far as the United States is concerned, may encounter strong opposition.

Heavy food shipments financed by our government also give rise to serious and awkward problems in our relations with other exporting nations. The United States has for many years been committed to the broad, over-all policy that we should move as rapidly as practicable toward relatively free international trade and the elimination or de-emphasis of export and import quotas, discriminatory tariffs, export subsidies, export dumping and so on. But when we seek to unload quickly large stocks of agricultural commodities at reduced prices or for soft currencies, or even as gifts, we undermine our own announced policy and almost certainly make it harder to re-establish world trade on a freely operating and constructive basis.

Long-Term Plans Needed

These then are some of the problems raised by disposal of our surpluses. Are there things we can do to overcome them and still make effective use of the abundance we are currently so well able to spare? As yet, we have not been willing to face

frankly one of the essentials for constructive handling of this difficult situation. If we are to give real help to the less fortunate peoples of the world, we must make longer-term commitments than those we have been making in the past. No country can afford to decrease necessary domestic production in order to take advantage of a temporary bargain in foreign supplies. Production patterns and national programs cannot be altered quickly or capriciously. Because of this, other nations cannot afford to be dependent on the year-to-year decisions of our Congress or on unpredictable changes in the output or availability of vital foodstuffs.

This means that until the United States is willing to enter into fairly long-term commitments to provide supplementary supplies, needy countries will continue to look on our offers of excess foods at bargain prices as an effort to solve our own surplus problems, not as a genuine approach to the solution of their difficulties.

U.S. Food Competition

Let us look at still another aspect of the problem. This country is or has been long on the production of wheat, cotton, rice, corn, butter, cheese and some other items. Wheat is the product in which our excess is largest, and most obvious. But Canada, too, has heavy stocks of wheat and is one of the world's leading wheat exporters. Australia and Argentina are also wheat competitors.

Unless orderly arrangements are worked out with competing supplier nations, the inevitable result will be chaotic marketing conditions and serious deterioration in our relations with these countries whose over-all interests are so closely in line with our own. One possible approach would be to have the big wheat surplus countries, primarily the United

States and Canada, with the collaboration of Australia and Argentina, undertake jointly to work out an orderly plan for liquidation of excess stocks now on hand or likely to arise in the next few years. This would involve setting up a mutually acceptable program under which such portions of stocks and production as can flow normally would be released to the regular commercial markets under competitive arrangements regarded as reasonable and fair. The excess would be segregated and liquidated under a fairly long-term program which would give special attention to abnormal outlets and the building up of the poorer underdeveloped countries.

This would mean cooperative rather than uncoordinated handling of surpluses and could be a way of moving toward healthier and more normal trading arrangements. There are precedents for this type of approach. One of them, which proved notably successful, was the program of United Kingdom-Dominion Wool Disposals, Limited, set up at the close of World War II to liquidate the huge excess stocks of wool then held. Admittedly, the problem dealt with by that organization was simpler than that of food, but there are elements of similarity in the two situations.

The principal mechanism currently used in financing the export of excess farm products is that provided under Public Law 480 (the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954). Under Title I of this act, United States surplus farm products may be sold to other countries for payments made in their own currencies. The funds so acquired become the property of the United States but cannot, for the time being at least, be transferred to this country in dollars. They are, however, available for long-term development loans to the country pur-

chasing the commodities and for certain other purposes. This device is similar in principle to the counterpart fund arrangement used in the Marshall Plan program for Western Europe in the late 1940's.

Public Law 480

There has been a good deal of criticism of the P. L. 480 program, some of it undoubtedly warranted. However, it seems likely that this program or something similar to it will continue to be used over the next few years. Some of the criticism is due to the fact that loans made from these blocked currency accounts are negotiated by means of bilateral agreements—a procedure which may cause the recipient to fear economic domination by the lending country, that is, the United States.

If suitable arrangements could be made, there would seem to be merit in channeling these counterpart funds into some type of development loan fund administered by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (or the proposed International Development Association). At least that possibility warrants full exploration. If feasible, it would enlarge the funds available to the World Bank or to some subsidiary organization for use in making certain types of development loans and would put the administration of the funds in the hands of a neutral international agency rather than an American agency—the International Cooperation Administration (ICA). This arrangement would help to avoid duplication of effort and would lessen the danger of tension between the United States and the borrowing country. It would, of course, require new legislation and some changes in our relationship with the World Bank.

Only one other aspect of the problem can be mentioned here—by all odds the most difficult and the most

baffling. World population is increasing too fast, and the pace may accelerate before it declines. There is very grave danger that the disparities between the well-fed and the poorly fed nations will become wider instead of narrower. It is not inconceivable that the average level of nutritional adequacy may decline instead of improving.

We hear occasionally some rather foolish talk about this problem. Surely the world can feed many more people if it is merely a matter of keeping them alive. But if we want real improvements in the quality of living, we cannot go on increasing the number of mouths to be fed at so fast a rate as we have been doing over the past half century. There is more to a good life than the number of calories available for consumption. Overcrowding gives rise to many problems besides that of maintaining food supplies. Even here in the United States, the rate of population increase may rise further before it declines.

In the more crowded areas of the world some steps looking to a slowing of the population growth rate are now being taken. As yet, however, the results are hardly noticeable. Population growth is the fundamental problem of the future, and unless we find ways to deal with it, the gloomy prognostications of Thomas Malthus at the end of the 18th century may yet prove to be all too realistic.

READING SUGGESTIONS: Merrill K. Bennett, *The World's Food, A Study of the Interrelations of World Populations, National Diets, and Food Potentials* (New York, Harper, 1954); Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, *Man and Hunger, World Food Problems No. 2* (Rome, 1957); Sir Edward John Russell, *World Population and World Food Supplies* (London, Allen & Unwin, 1954); Theodore W. Schultz, ed., *Food for the World* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1945); *World Population and Resources*, a report by Political and Economic Planning, London (distributed by Essential Books, 16-00 Pollitt Drive, Fair Lawn, N.J., 1955).

Spotlight

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Thus, basically—and leaving aside the propaganda pressures of communism—any success registered by the U.S.S.R. now and in the future—particularly in the technological fields where the United States has been regarded as without peers—will be more heavily scored in its favor than it would be for the United States. Dr. Samuel Johnson was quoted as saying that “a woman preaching is like a dog’s walking on his hind legs. It is not done well, but you are surprised to find it done at all.” So for the millions of underdeveloped peoples around the globe what is interesting about Russia is not that it has caught up with the United States in some respects, but that it is even capable of producing sputniks and cars, missiles and ships.

The real challenge of the future is not whether the U.S.S.R. will some day become technologically the equal of the United States; at least in some aspects of industry—in the absence of war, this possibility is not discounted by experts. The challenge is in terms of the way of life the two contenders can provide for their peoples. In this respect no one—not even the most hardened Communists—would deny, even if public acknowledgment of this does not always come easy, that the American

way of life offers political freedoms and physical comforts not now available in the U.S.S.R.

But before we leap to the conclusion that this obviously shows we have won and they have lost the historic contest, we must consider two things. First, the majority of human beings outside of the Atlantic community do not enjoy even the present Russian way of life, let alone the American way; and until they do, the Russians will still seem ahead. And, second, there is no reason to believe now—and there was no reason to believe this even in Stalin’s time—that the Russian Communists (even assuming that they remain unchanged, which is a challengeable assumption about any group of human beings) favor a permanently ascetic way of life. Austerity, even misery, was regarded as the price that had to be paid for the transformation of Russia’s backward agrarian economy into a nuclear industrial state. One can properly argue as to whether or not the price was excessive—although as we see the need for austerity in other underdeveloped countries if development is to be achieved without complete dependence on the West, we may review our estimate on this score.

Now, however, that the base for Soviet industrialization has been

laid, it is already becoming apparent that while the new middle class has not yet pressed for the establishment of democratic institutions, it is ready and increasingly able to seek books and records, radios and TV sets, education and enjoyment of the arts. The fact that these pleasures and amenities are still in short supply, or that the model apartment of the U.S.S.R. exhibition is still a dream for most Russians, does not mean that the dreams will not be implemented. The important thing is that the Russians can now start dreaming about Dior gowns instead of having to think only of dams and steel mills. We, too, have our dreams—obviously more advanced than those of the Russians—and who among us would say that we think we have achieved perfection of human existence within the terms of our wealth and technical capabilities?

If contest there is to be, it is important that it should be conducted without mutual misconceptions and mutual recriminations. The plane of contest is not so much technological achievement as the philosophy and sense of values which are reflected in democracy or communism. In this respect the United States does not need to compete with Russia, but only to vie for ever greater improvement of its own institutions.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

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MR. PAUL WANLEY
17917 SCHENELY AVE.
CLEVELAND 19, OHIO

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